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ROBERT M. O'NEIL
OF JUSTICE DELAYED AND JUSTICE
DENIED: THE WELFARE PRIOR
HEARING CASES
Two decades ago, Mr. Justice Frankfurter deemed essential to due
process of law "the right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the
stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction."' This broad precept
is unexceptionable. Yet its application has been far from uniform.
On the very day it was announced, the Court upheld the dismissal
without any formal hearing of a federal civil servant suspected of
disloyalty on the basis of personal and political affiliations.2 In other
instances of denial or withdrawal of government benefits-where
"grievous loss" is surely incurred-the availability of a hearing has
been a matter of much doubt.3
The historical development of the constitutional right to a hear-
ing is full of discontinuities, lacunae, and contradictions. Where
deprivation of life or liberty is threatened, there has never been any
Robert M. O'Neil is Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
This article has benefited from helpful comments by Professor Hans A. Linde
and Peter Sitkin, Esq.-R. M. O'N.
1 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
2 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (equally divided Court).
3 See generally Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1956).
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question about the right to be heard before sanctions are imposed. 4
Where tangible property is to be taken (directly or indirectly) the
opportunity for adversary process has long been recognized." When
less tangible interests are at stake, however, the precedents form a
curious patchwork. Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court held
without dissent that a certified public accountant had a constitu-
tional right to a hearing before his application for admission to prac-
tice before the Tax Court could be rejected." For a decade now, the
lower courts have uniformly held that a student at a state college or
university 7 (and occasionally at a private institution)s is entitled to
a full and formal hearing before being expelled or suspended for
a long period. Yet as recently as 1965 Professor Charles Reich ob-
served that "in the case of a decision removing a family from public
housing, or a decision denying aid to families with dependent chil-
dren, generally the matter is finally determined at some level within
the appropriate agency, after investigation by the agency, and with
comparatively informal procedures, if any, available to the persons
affected."9 In the sensitive realm of public employment-where only
a fraction of all workers enjoy civil service or tenure protection-a
constitutional right to be heard before being discharged has never
been generally recognized by the courts.10 Thus the formality of
procedures found even in the regulatory and licensing sectors are
notably absent from the administration of many government benefit
programs."'
4 E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
5 E.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
6 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
7Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
8 See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
9 Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1252 (1965).
10 The situation today is substantially as described by Professor Davis over a
decade ago. See 1 DAvis, ADMINisTRA-IvE LAW TREA IS E 463-73 (1958). The one
possible exception is the very recent decision in Olson v. Regents, 301 F. Supp. 1356
(D. Minn. 1969). Most of the scholarly writing on the constitutional aspects of
public employment-e.g., Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Em-
ployees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 751 (1969)-has concerned itself with the substantive protections for free
expression and political activity in the public sector and not with procedural safe-
guards.
11 See Reich, note 9 supra, at 1253.
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The reluctance of the courts to extend procedural protections to
government beneficiaries is not easily explained. One theory is that
such safeguards are seldom sought or conferred until after judicial
recognition of major substantive rights. Yet the protection of the
rights of college and university students developed in just the op-
posite sequence: the courts began by holding that a student was
entitled to a formal hearing before being dismissed or expelled-2 and
then proceeded to define the substantive civil liberties a student
might claim.13
A second possibility is that administrative regulations (or the an-
ticipation of them) made the quest for constitutional safeguards less
urgent. To some extent this has been the case in public housing,
where a strong directive from the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development has largely mooted the due process issue.' 4 But in
other contexts, there would have been no protection at all if the
courts had awaited agency action; clearly this is so in the student
rights area, and more recently with respect to welfare."
A third and more credible theory is that courts have been slow to
accord procedural protection to government beneficiaries because
the interests affected were so long characterized as "privileges" or
gratuities. 6 In the 1951 case of the summarily discharged civil ser-
vant,17 the court of appeals maintained that a government employee
had never been entitled to a "hearing of the quasi-judicial type"
because the guarantees of due process applied only when "one is be-
ing deprived of something to which he has a right."' 8 Yet even the
untimely persistence and the slow death of the right-privilege dis-
tinction"9 do not adequately explain the lag in developing proce-
12Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Knight
v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
13 See for a thorough review of the evolution of these protections, Wright, The
Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969).
14 See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
11 On the cat-and-mouse relationship between the regulation proposed by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Court decision finally
settling the issue, see text infra, at notes 70-73.
16 See 1 DAvis, note 10 supra, at 452-62.
17 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Is Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
19 See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Comment, The First Amendment
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dural safeguards for the government beneficiary. The Supreme
Court has held for nearly a quarter-century that labeling certain
interests as "privileges" does not permit government agencies to dis-
pense or condition them in ways that abridge freedom of speech or
discriminate on racial or religious grounds.20
Finally, the delay may be attributable simply to the fortuities of
test case litigation. In the student rights area, lawyers began by
pressing for hearings, in the hope that reinstatement would typically
follow even a rudimentary observance of due process.21 In the pub-
lic housing field, litigation of all sorts began much later and con-
centrated initially on substantive issues. 22 In the welfare area, at-
torneys were simply unavailable to bring test suits until the mid-
19601S.2 3 And their first concerns were such outrages upon client
interests as man-in-the-house, 24 employable mother,21 and one-year
waiting period regulations. 26 Thus the first test suits aslkng that a
client be heard before benefits were terminated simply did not reach
and Public Employees-an Emerging Constitutional Right to Be a Policeman? 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1968).
20 The series of cases began with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), or
perhaps even with Everson v. Bd. of Educ, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
21 The two earliest cases of the "modem" period of student rights, Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); and Knight v. State Bd.
of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961), were in fact much more civil rights
than student rights cases. They were brought by attorneys for civil rights organi-
zations, seeking a recognition of the compatibility of college attendance at tax-
supported institutions and protest against racial segregation.
22 For discussion of efforts to obtain recognition for tenants' substantive rights
during the 1960's, see Note, Governnent Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YALE
Lj. 508 (1967). There had been a rash of cases during the early 1950's over the
constitutionality of a federally required loyalty oath imposed on public housing
tenants. See, e.g., Notes, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 1166 (1953); 69 HARV. L. REv. 551 (1956).
Then the housing field was virtually dormant for almost a decade until substantive
rights were reasserted in, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1968); Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 266
F. Supp. 397 (ED. Va. 1966).
23 See, e.g., US. DEPARTmENT oF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, NEIGHBOR-
HOOD LEGAL SERVIcEs-NEw DIIIENSIONS IN THE LAw (1966); LAw AND POVERTY
1965: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAw AND POVERTY (1965).
24 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
2 5 See Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
26 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the Court until the late 1960's-long after a series of substantive
rights had been tested and vindicated.
Now the decisions of the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly2s
and Wheeler v. Montgomery2 -holding that a welfare recipient is
constitutionally entitled to a pretermination hearing-provide the
occasion for a re-examination of this whole field of law. After a brief
summary of these two cases, I shall proceed to appraise and analyze
the decisions-both in terms of what was decided and what was only
implied. Against this welfare law background, I shall then consider
analogous questions in other government benefit programs. It is nec-
essary to look not only at the beneficiary who is terminated, ex-
pelled, or evicted but also at the one whose status is simply not
renewed at the end of a term, and even the one whose initial appli-
cation is denied or rejected. The issues become increasingly difficult
and the cases correspondingly fewer throughout this series of ques-
tions.
I. WELFARE BENEFITS AND PRIOR HEARINGS
A. THE OPINIONS
The issues of the right to a prior hearing reached the Supreme
Court in parallel cases from New York ° and California.3' Both
states provided fair hearings to beneficiaries who sought them after
termination, in accord with the federal statutory requirement for all
categorical assistance programs.3 2 In addition, New York and Cali-
fornia offered prior notice of the proposed action to any recipient
27 See Comment, The Constitutional Mininnm for the Termination of Welfare
Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 MICH. L. REv.
112 (1969), for a review of the cases and the litigation strategy while the issue was
pending before the Supreme Court.
28 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 29 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
30 Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
31 Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (ND. Cal. 1968). There were many
other suits pending at the time, e.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn.
1968); Camerena v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120 (1969).
32 42 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (4) (old-age assistance or medical assistance for the aged);
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (4) (aid to families with dependent children). The statute specifies
neither the time at which the "fair hearing" should be held nor the contents of the
hearing. The law thus leaves much room for administrative interpretation and
implementation. There seems to be some uncertainty about the extent of compli-
ance with this mandate. Comment, note 27 supra.
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threatened with loss of benefits, and at least an informal conference
at which arguments could be advanced against termination. But nei-
ther state provided a formal adversary or evidentiary hearing before
the cutoff took effect.
A majority of the Supreme Court found this procedure constitu-
tionally defective.3 3 The opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan began by
observing that welfare benefits "are a matter of statutory entitle-
ment for persons qualified to receive them."34 While conceding that
in certain instances government benefits might be terminated with-
out affording a prior hearing-notably instances in which some
emergency was present-the Court found especially compelling and
urgent the plight of the welfare beneficiary removed from the
rolls: 
35
... termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means
by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent
resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His
need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily sub-
sistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress
from the welfare bureaucracy.
Thus pretermination hearings were "indispensable" to the needs of
the welfare system as well as those of the individual beneficiary:
"The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of
welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible
to receive it."36
Countervailing interests were unpersuasive to the majority. While
the prior-hearing requirement might entail some additional expense
and administrative inconvenience, the basis of the objections was
really only fiscal. However worthy in the abstract, the state's inter-
est in conserving its resources could not outweigh the claims of the
destitute beneficiary. And though the state probably could not re-
coup from judgment-proof recipients any payments erroneously
made, "much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can
be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre-termination
hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities. ' 37 Moreover,
33 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The decision was 5 to 3, with Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Black and Stewart in dissent.
34397 U.S. at 262. 36 Id. at 265.
351 d. at 264. 37 Id. at 266.
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due process need not include both pre- and post-termination pro-
cedures. If the state simply chose to continue payments until a "fair"
hearing (consistent with the federal statute) could be held, a single
hearing would suffice .3
The opinion of the majority concluded by defining the contours
of the hearing that must precede termination. It need not take the
form of a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial." This hearing had a single
purpose: "to produce an initial determination" of the validity of the
welfare agency's decision to stop payments in a particular case.
Thus "minimal procedural safeguards" would suffice at this stage.
These rudiments must, however, include "adequate notice detailing
the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity
to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
[the recipient's] own arguments and evidence orally." Only such a
personal and formal appearance would suffice to protect the client's
constitutional rights; he must be able to "confront and cross examine
witnesses relied on by the department. 3'9 He must be allowed rep-
resentation by retained counsel, although the agency is not obli-
gated to appoint counsel. The decision of the hearing officer must
rest "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hear-
ing." ' Accordingly, reasons must be given for the decision and
references made to the pertinent evidence. Finally, an "impartial
decision-maker is essential." While prior involvement of a welfare
official in some aspect of the case would not absolutely disqualify
him from presiding at the hearing, "he should not have ... partici-
pated in making the determination under review."'"
There were three dissenting opinions. Mr. Justice Stewart noted
in a cryptic paragraph that, though he found the issue a close one,
he would sustain the constitutionality of the present state practices.42
Mr. Justice Black argued at some length that the majority had en-
gaged in unwarranted judicial legislation. He thought the decision
was, moreover, without precedent; he could recall no previous in-
stance "in which the person alleged to owe money to another is re-
quired by law to continue making payments to a judgment-proof
claimant without the benefit of any security or bond to insure that
these payments can be recovered if he wins his legal argument."43
aSId. at 267 and n. 14. 4 11d. at 271.
3 Id. at 270. 42 Id. at 285 (dissenting opinion).
40 Id. at 271. 43 Id. at 277-78 (dissenting opinion).
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Finally, he expressed concern that the decision might hurt indigent
persons as a class more than it would help, by causing welfare agen-
cies to tighten the procedure for determining initial eligibility.
While assuring that many beneficiaries could not be removed sum-
marily, the decision will "also have insured that many will never
get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the
lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility.
44
The Chief Justice, in an opinion which Mr. Justice Black joined,
expressed two additional concerns: First, he thought the intervention
of the Court both unwise and unnecessary because the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare had already proposed a regula-
tion providing most of the protections sought by the beneficiaries in
these two cases.45 Second, he felt the logic of the majority opinion
must carry well beyond its holdings, so the Court could not con-
scientiously refuse to extend comparable protections to, inter alia,
"welfare reductions or denial of increases as opposed to terminations,
or decisions concerning initial applications or requests for special as-
sistance."46 Yet the majority had said nothing about these less drastic
changes in status, and this the Chief Justice thought regrettable if
not disingenuous.
B. A QUESTION OF TIMING
The result seems not only sound, but almost inevitable-given the
way the issue was framed. Largely through the accident of litiga-
tion, the question that really was central and basic-whether a wel-
fare recipient has a constitutional right to a formal, adversary hear-
ing at all-was never before the Court. All the parties assumed that
a dispute over continuing eligibility had to be submitted to an evi-
dentiary hearing at some time, the only question being at what stage
of the termination process. As far as categorical assistance programs
were involved, of course, the issue was narrowed in this way by the
"fair hearing" mandate of the Social Security Act.47 For all other
welfare programs-general assistance payments deriving from state
and/or local funds-the availability of a formal hearing was theo-
retically an open issue. But New York and California law required
44 Id. at 279 (dissenting opinion).
45 Id. at 283 (dissenting opinion). 46 Id. at 285 (dissenting opinion).
47 42 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (4) (old-age assistance or medical assistance for the aged);
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (4) (aid to families with dependent children).
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procedures at least as fair as did the federal statute. If this first case
had come from a less enlightened state (Georgia or Mississippi, for
example), the Court would not simply have assumed the major
premise on the way to announcing the minor one but would have
had to face squarely the underlying issue of the right to a hearing
as such.
Since only the issue of timing and not that of hearing was before
the Court, a different result would have been puzzling. There have
been instances, as the majority opinion noted, in which a constitu-
tional right to be heard has been postponed until after the comple-
tion of the contested action.48 But the circumstances justifying de-
ferral of a conceded right to notice, personal appearance, and con-
frontation, are highly unusual.4 9 There are the classic "emergency"
cases-food is about to spoil and must be kept from grocers' shelves;
a fraud is about to be perpetrated on unsuspecting securities pur-
chasers; or a professional licensee is continuing to offer his services
to trusting clients after having perpetrated malpractice.8 0 In these
situations, the reason for acting now and hearing later are incon-
testable. Moreover, there is usually an adequate remedy after the
fact; if the victim of summary action later prevails, he can be made
whole or nearly whole through money damages.
Apart from these emergency situations, there seems almost a gen-
eral presumption that one who is constitutionally entitled to be
heard at all should be heard before the change in status occurs. Few
cases have dealt specifically with the issue of timing. Occasionally
the matter of timing is unimportant to either party; more often the
dispensing or regulating agency feels its own interests as well as
those of the individual are best served by dispatch and voluntarily
provides for early resolution of contested claims.51
In at least two contexts the Court has clearly recognized the need
to assure a hearing in advance of detrimental action. Just before the
welfare hearing cases were docketed, a nearly unanimous Court
4 8 E.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
49 See generally 1 DAvis, note 10 supra, at 438-44.
50 E.g., Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 212 Wis. 184 (1933).
51 There is, of course, a substantial body of law concerning the timing of judicial
review of administrative action. In some instances review may be accelerated, in
others postponed, and in still others seemingly foreclosed altogether, although the
courts are most reluctant to find review completely unavailable. See generally
JAFFF, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcnoN 353-76 (1965).
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held Wisconsin's prejudgment wage-garnishment procedure consti-
tutionally deficient because no provision was made for a hearing
before the attachment took effect. 52 The majority opinion stressed
the plight of the debtor who, though wholly dependent upon his
earnings, lacked any opportunity to contest the garnishment in ad-
vance of seizure. The Court concluded: "The result is that a pre-
judgment garnishment ... may as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall. Where the taking of one's property is so
obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent
notice and a prior hearing. . . this pre-judgment garnishment pro-
cedure violates the fundamental principles of due process. 5 3
The other context in which the timing of the hearing has been
litigated-the seizure of allegedly obscene materials-suggests a par-
allel basis for requiring advance resolution of conflicting claims. The
leading case is A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas.5 4 Over two
dissents, the Court held violative of due process a state procedure
for seizure and destruction of salacious publications without a prior
adversary hearing to determine the central question of obscenity.
The statute did provide for a full and fair hearing after the seizure.
But the Court found that alternative constitutionally insufficient:
"For if seizure of books precedes an adversary determination of
their obscenity, there is danger of abridgment of the right of the
public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene
books." 55 The risk of error was substantial. The consequences of
error were not only detrimental to basic societal interests but effec-
tively irreversible.
The welfare cases present a claim for prior hearing at least as
strong as those just considered-and in any event far stronger than
the routine case in which the normal presumption of priority seems
to operate. Various special factors militate for pretermination notice
and confrontation. First, the New York and California procedures
before the Court were about the most benign afforded anywhere in
the country, for beneficiaries of general as well as categorical assis-
52 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
53 Id. at 341-42.
54 378 U.S. 205 (1964). For recent reaffirmation of this principle in the context
of motion pictures, about which the Kansas case left some doubt, see Natali v.
Municipal Ct., 309 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
55 378 U.S. at 213.
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tance programs. Unlike many states, these two complied fully with
federal statutory requirements at the post-termination stage. 56 More-
over, they did offer beneficiaries threatened with termination a no-
tice which the Court foiind constitutionally adequate both in time
and in form. The constitutional deficiency lay in the content of the
hearing. Thus, if hardship could be found in California and New
York proceedings, much greater injustice could be expected else-
where.
Second, a disproportionately high rate of reversals in the few
instances where figures are kept5 7 suggests an unusual risk of error
inherent in the welfare eligibility process. Various circumstances
may make this aspect of administrative action less reliable than oth-
ers: the heavy caseload burden placed upon often inexperienced
caseworkers; the high rate of turnover among caseworkers; the dif-
ficulty of garnering accurate information about a population that
is frequently anonymous and difficult to reach and with whom com-
munication is severely hampered by suspicion and by barriers of
language and culture; and the lack of adequate funds within the
welfare budget for detailed record keeping or verification of leads,
tips, and accusations about client conduct.5" Thus the propensity for
error at the factual level is understandably quite high. The danger
of wholly erroneous determinations, with attendant serious injus-
tice, is correspondingly great. These circumstances argue strongly
for an independent assessment of the factual basis of an adverse ad-
ministrative action before the action is taken.
Third, the consequences of termination are quite drastic indeed,
for reasons hinted at but not fully developed by the Kelly majority.
The typical recipient, of course, does not seek welfare until he has
already lost the capacity and exhausted the resources to support
GO For the variations in extent of state compliance with federal mandate, see Note,
Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 91-92
(1967).
57 See Bell & Norvell, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TEX. L.
R~v. 223-24 (1967); Brief for Appellants, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280
(1970), at pp. 12-13. The latter source cites eligibility control figures of the Cali-
fornia Department of Social Welfare showing that 8 percent of AFDC families
had been found on review to have been wrongfully terminated, while in only 1
percent of all cases was aid mistakenly continued.
58 See Note, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems
and Proposals for Reforn in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1326-27 (1967).
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himself."9 To remove any doubt, most states require an applicant
who comes to the agency in a financially marginal condition to be-
come destitute and dependent before payments can begin.6 Char-
acteristic is Connecticut's asset ceiling of $250 per velfare family,
including even the cash value of life insurance.6' Even more strin-
gent is the Illinois rule (for recipients of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children) limiting retention of cash or personal property
or life insurance to the value of one month's assistance grant. 2 The
mechanism by which self-sufficiency is impaired varies somewhat
from state to state, but the effect is uniform. And the result is clear:
the family that is erroneously stricken from the welfare rolls may
be able to survive on its retained resources (if the maximum amount
has in fact been retained), but not for long. The destitute condition
that compels the beneficiary to seek welfare in the first place com-
bines with the process of qualifying for payments to make the typi-
cal beneficiary totally dependent upon what he receives from month
to month from the agency.63
Fourth, the post-termination hearing clearly does not afford an
adequate alternative. While factual errors can presumably be cor-
rected as well after administrative action as before, the incentive to
seek rectification is seriously weakened by the action itself. It is
hardly surprising that few beneficiaries do in fact appeal termina-
tions or reductions after the fact. In Illinois, for example, post-termi-
nation appeals were filed in a scant one-third of 1 percent of all
public assistance cases closed during a sample period several years
ago.64 Comparable experience in the District of Columbia showed
a slightly more frequent resort to the formal hearing (about 1.5 per-
cent), although about half the initial requests were withdrawn after
an informal conference.6 The few other states where appeal rates
have been sampled offer similar evidence.66
59 See Briar, Welfare fron Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare Sys-
ten, in LAW OF THM POOR 46, 50 (J. ten Broek ed. 1966).
60 Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE
L.J. 1234, 1242 (1967).
61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.
63 See Burrus & Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the
Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience, 16 Am.
U. L. REv. 199, 215 (1967).
64 Note, note 60 supra, at 1244.
65 Burrus & Fessler, note 63 supra, at 213.
66 E.g., in Texas, see Bell & Norvell, note 57 supra, at 223, 233.
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There may be many reasons, no doubt, for the passivity of termi-
nated welfare recipients. Arguably, of course, the administrative
decision goes unchallenged in most cases because it is substantially
correct. Yet no one who has surveyed the situation accepts this
explanation for the great majority of unappealed decisions. The
operative causes undoubtedly lie deeper. In some cases, beneficiaries
may simply not know they have recourse if they are wrongfully
terminated. Far more often, they have the bare information but do
not know how to use it. "The point is not whether they were told
about these rights," observes Scott Briar (who has sampled welfare
client attitudes extensively). "Our observations indicate that many,
if not most, of these recipients probably were given this informa-
tion by the social worker-but rather that the information probably
is not particularly meaningful and useful to a person who sees him-
self as a suppliant, and therefore it may be ignored or soon forgot-
ten' '0 (Briar's survey discovered, for example, appalling misconcep-
tions about the person to whom a complaint should be made in
the event of disagreement about disposition of any part of the case.)
Joel Handler and his associates have noted the same phenomenon
in more recent surveys of welfare recipients in Wisconsin. Senior
administrators argued that the paucity of appeals and requests for
hearings reflected the fairness and the accuracy of the system. But
"administrators younger and closer to the field said that there was
a great deal of withholding of information from clients, that admin-
istration was highly discretionary, and that the administrative appeal
system was not working because clients were either unaware of
their rights or were afraid of exercising them."68 Thus, as one com-
mentator recently explained the wide gap between theoretical avail-
ability and actual use of post-termination hearings: "The welfare
recipient may be illiterate; he may not understand how to obtain a
hearing; he may regard welfare as a charity and not realize that it
may be asserted as a right; he may believe that requesting a hearing
would damage his interests by angering the social worker; or he
may be afraid to attend the hearing."69 In any case, the bare oppor-
tunity to appeal a termination after it has taken effect does not seem
always or adequately to protect client interests.
07 Briar, note 59 supra, at 55.
6s Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1969).
69 Comment, note 27 supra, at 130-31.
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Finally, there is the pendency of the new HEW regulation,
which Chief Justice Burger thought more or less mooted the case.
The language had been drafted and announced many months before
the cases reached the Supreme Court. The new ruling provides that
whenever a fair hearing is requested because of termination or sus-
pension of payments, "assistance will be continued during the peri-
od of appeal and through the end of the month in which a final
decision on the fair hearing is reached." 7 At first glance, this regula-
tion would appear to protect recipients' rights even more broadly
than the Supreme Court's decision; it requires not merely an evi-
dentiary hearing before payments stop but the statutory fair hear-
ing, containing safeguards not ordered by the Court for the pre-
termination stage.
The mere pendency of the regulation did not, however, afford
a viable alternative to the constitutional recognition of a hearing
right. First, there was some doubt whether the regulation would
ever have taken effect had the Court not made it almost superflu-
ous.7 1 The new rule was scheduled to go into force July 1, 1969.
Implementation was postponed to October 1 of the same year and
further postponed to July 1, 1970, by which time the Supreme
Court would surely have decided the two pending cases. HEW
could easily have taken the credit for moving first had that been its
desired.2 Moreover, the Solicitor General in his amicus curiae brief
expressly relied only on the old regulations and even cast doubt
upon the wisdom of the proposed new policy of continuing bene-
fits: "[C]ogent policy considerations support the Secretary's judg-
ment that the ... practice [of holding no prior hearing] should be
followed where... the State initially decides to terminate or reduce
benefits.173
Even if implementation of the new HEW policy had been assured,
a constitutional decision would still have been vital. There are obvi-
ous lacunae. The federal rule applies, of course, only to categorical
7 0 34 FED. REG. 1144 (1969).
71 See Christensen, Of Prior Hearings and Welfare As "New Property," 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 321, 336 (1970).
72 The Department of Housing and Urban Development, by contrast, did issue
a comparable regulation in advance of a binding Supreme Court decision. See
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
73 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
U.S. 280 (1970), at p. 23.
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assistance in which federal funds are used, and has no bearing what-
ever on state-supported general assistance programs such as New
York's home relief, involved in some of the cases of several plain-
tiffs in the Kelly case. Moreover, there is some doubt about the
enforceability of a hearing right that derives solely from a regula-
tion of this kind. To be sure, the Supreme Court took a rather hard
line in the application of a parallel HUD regulation dealing with
public housing evictions, even insisting that directive be given retro-
active effect.7 4 Yet, as one commentator has observed: "Federal wel-
fare regulations are administrative directives addressed solely to state
agencies, and do not grant substantive rights to individuals. Thus,
under the new federal regulation, there is no right to a prior hearing,
and a recipient who bases his claim solely on that regulation may be
unable to obtain relief in either a state or federal court. ' '7' Finally,
of course, an administrative ruling of this kind-particularly one
drafted in the last days of the Democratic administration and greet-
ed with little enthusiasm by Republican successors-is a rather shaky
reed to which to bind such fundamental rights. Because it was al-
ways subject to modification or .even revocation, the administrative
directive needed the reinforcement of constitutional doctrine ade-
quately to protect the vital interests of welfare recipients.
Thus the result that the Court reached in this pair of cases seems
eminently sound. Further reflection and analysis strengthen the case
in favor of a prior hearing. Not only is the general presumption
operative in favor of the right to be heard in advance of a serious
deprivation, but the governmental interest in postponing the hear-
ing is rather insubstantial. In addition, the interests of the affected
individual are unusually strong. So strong, in fact, that one might
well say the opportunity to be heard is meaningful only if the
hearing occurs while the beneficiary is still receiving subsistence
payments.
C. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
There is much left unsaid in the welfare hearing cases. Most of
the omissions must have been deliberate in view of the explicit and
pointed references of the dissenters. Yet they may be troublesome
in the future and must therefore be taken into account by anyone
74 Thorpe v. Durham Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
75 Comment, note 27 supra, at 117.
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seeking to determine the meaning of these decisions for the re-
definition of due process.
1. The initial determination of eligibility. The only reference to
procedural protections during the initial determination of eligibility
for welfare came in the dissent of the Chief Justice. The reference
was only a casual suggestion that the majority had raised "intriguing
possibilities" about procedural claims at other stages of welfare
administration, including the intake decision.78 Yet this question
obviously lurks nearby. The brief of the Solicitor General implied
that a decision to grant a pretermination hearing might logically
require comparable treatment before rejecting even a frivolous ap-
plication.7 The joint brief of the claimants, in reply to the United
States, vigorously disputed the suggestion on two grounds. First,
that settled principles of administrative law recognize "a well
founded and established distinction between initial denial and re-
vocation of statutory rights, entitlement or privileges . . . which
is as valid and recognized in the welfare context as in all others." '
Second, the reply brief argued that "by hypothesis the recipient of
aid is far more dependent and vulnerable than the applicant."7
The strategy was sound. For the moment it kept the Court's mind
off collateral issues. But the argument was not so sound. The issue
will surely return before long. One very thoughtful analysis of the
intake process argues forcefully that the rejected applicant needs
and merits a hearing for the very reasons that support the incumbent
beneficiary's claim to pretermination notice and confrontation. 0
The question is obviously not settled. The implications of Kelly
for several types of initial determinations are considered below.81
2. Changes in status less drastic than termination. Chief Justice
Burger also reminded his colleagues they had not dealt with the
procedural interests of the beneficiary whose payments are reduced
summarily or who is denied a requested increase because of the
caseworker's spot judgment. There may be informal internal ave-
"78Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
77 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
U.S. 280 (1970), at pp. 2 2- 23.
78&Brief in Reply to the United States as Amicus Curiae, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), at p. 6.
79Id. at n. 5.
80 Note, note 58 supra, at 1327-28. 81 See text infra, at notes 202-08.
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nues of appeal from such decisions. But the fair hearing assured by
federal law does not apply to such interim administrative acts.8 2
Much less is there any guarantee of a formal hearing under state law
in the dispensation of general assistance payments. Yet in some cases
a sharp reduction in benefit levels, or a refusal to increase payments
when the recipient's status changes materially, may affect client
interests almost as severely as the complete cessation of payments.
Nor did Kelly deal explicitly with the recurrent problem of
temporary suspension rather than final termination of payments.
The welfare laws of most states do permit summary suspension of
benefits "even where no specific cause for ineligibility has been
found."' 3 Hence the case for notice and confrontation may be even
stronger here than in the termination situation with which the Court
actually dealt, since there at least a formal hearing is available after
payments finally cease. Maybe the Court meant to assimilate sus-
pension and termination without quite saying so. The Kelly opinion
speaks throughout only of "termination." But the much briefer
Wheeler opinion characterizes Kelly as holding that a pretermina-
tion evidentiary hearing is required "before welfare payments may
be discontinued or suspended."84 Although this is the only reference
to temporary changes in a beneficiary's status, it may suffice. 5
3. Beneficiary rights after the hearing. The Kelly decision is quite
explicit about what the recipient is entitled to and when. But it fails
to take the process one step further. What happens if the pre-
termination decision is adverse (as it will be in most cases) and the
beneficiary appeals? (If in fact an internal appeal channel is pro-
yided, though none appears to be constitutionally required.) Must
benefits continue until the appeal has been decided, or may they
be terminated as soon as the initial decision is rendered? The HEW
regulation is also ambiguous on this point. It provides that benefits
must continue through the end of the month "in which the final
decision on the fair hearing is reached."
There is also an open question about the beneficiary's status dur-
ing judicial review. In fact, there is even considerable doubt he will
be able to litigate his claim at this stage. Mr. Justice Brennan ex-
pressly allowed that "a complete record and a comprehensive
8242 U.S.C. §§ 302 (a) (4), 602 (a) (4).
83 See Note, note 60 supra, at 1234-35.
84 397 US. at 282. 85 See Christensen, note 71 supra, at 336-37.
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opinion, which would serve primarily to facilitate judicial review
and to guide future decisions, need not be provided at the pre-
termination stage."86 If a court does take the case and reaches the
ma-erits, the Supreme Court decision says nothing about the agency's
obligation to continue payments until there is a final resolution of
the controversy. Of course the great majority of cases will never
go beyond the pretermination hearing. 7 But when the beneficiary
does seek court review and the court either lacks power or inclina-
tion to issue a status quo order pending decision, the issue left open
by Kelly will most surely arise.
4. Right to counsel. Despite its insistence on limiting the holding,
it seems doubtful the Court can logically stop by recognizing a
right to be represented by retained counsel. By definition, no wel-
fare client can afford a lawyer and must turn to legal aid and other
sources of volunteer counsel. A serious equal protection problem
may now be presented if welfare agencies permit representation by
counsel of beneficiaries fortunate or resourceful enough to obtain
the aid of an OEO Legal Services office but fail to make any pro-
vision for assignment of counsel for those less fortunate or less
resourceful."" Thus, Mr. Justice Black seems correct in assuming
that the logic of the decision must require appointment of counsel,
else "the right to counsel is a meaningless one since these people
are too poor to hire their own advocates."8' 9
5. The basis of the due process guarantees: property, "entitle-
ment," and other benefits. The cornerstone of the Kelly decision is
the conviction that the interest of a welfare beneficiary in not being
erroneously or summarily removed from the rolls merits constitu-
tional protection. The basis of that judgment requires some further
study. The Constitution provides only that due process must be
86 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
87Even the number of requests for pretermination hearings in those jurisdictions
where it is available is surprisingly small. See Brief in Reply to the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), at p. 19.
88 Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Ironically, the HEW regula-
tion requires that counsel be provided for all beneficiaries at the "fair hearing"
(which must, under that ruling, occur before payments terminate). 34 FED. REG.
1144, 1356, 1359 (1969). Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has recently
announced that attorneys will be provided for persons charged with consumer
fraud or other violations by the agency and who cannot afford to retain private
counsel. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1970, p. 67, col. 4.
89 397 U.S. at 278-79. See also Christensen, note 71 supra, at 339.
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observed in deprivations of life, liberty, and property. Most pre-
vious cases upholding claims to be heard-where a government
agency planned to proceed summarily-involved actual takings of
physical property. 90 Even in the 1969 wage garnishment decision,
on which the Court relied in Kelly, nearly jurisdictional emphasis
was placed upon "the taking of one's property."91 Conversely,
claims to be heard have most often been rejected because the claim-
ant was held to have no proprietary stake in the dispute. In Bailey
v. Richardson,92 for example, the court of appeals had refused to
order a hearing in the public employment context because "due
process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of
something to which he has a right."93
These distinctions revive the specter of the long-interred right-
privilege dichotomy. For some years the Supreme Court has delib-
erately avoided these labels and their irrational effects.94 In prior
cases involving, for example, social security95 and unemployment
compensation,96 the Court insisted it made no difference whether
one called receipt of such benefits a right or a privilege, or whether
a property interest could be established. "It is too late in the day,"
cautioned Mr. Justice Brennan seven years ago in the unemploy-
ment compensation case, "to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege. 91 7 The Court has simply avoided or
refused the temptation to classify government benefits in the process
of defining and extending safeguards for their enjoyment.9 8
Much in the Kelly opinion is, of course, consistent with this
approach. The Court did caution that "the constitutional challenge
cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits
90 E.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
91 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
92 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
03 182 F.2d at 58.
04 See generally Van Alstyne, note 19 supra; and Linde, Justice Douglas on Free-
dwn in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WAsH. L.
REv. 4 (1964).
95 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
9 0 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
o7 Id. at 404. 98 See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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are 'a "privilege" and not a "right." ' "9 But this caveat was pre-
ceded by the troubling observation that "such benefits are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."'
This comment could not have been inadvertent, since it supported
a lengthy footnote quoting from Professor Charles Reich's equation
of many newer forms of "entitlement" with more traditional pro-
prietary interests.' Thus it seems that the Court now accepts the
"new property" characterization of at least some forms of govern-
ment benefits and is willing to encompass many types of beneficiary
claims within the "property" dimension of the Due Process Clause.
The reference to "entitlement" invoked a response to Mr. Justice
Black, who chided the Court for failing to specify the proprietary
quality of welfare benefits: "It somewhat strains credulity to say
that a government's promise of charity to an individual is property
belonging to that individual when government denies that the
individual is honestly entitled to receive such payment."'1 2 The
majority might well have dismissed this challenge as irrelevant to
the issue before it, arguing, as has often been done in the past, that
interests in government benefits need not be so classified to merit
protection under the Due Process Clause.10 3
The fact that the Court did thus respond and did invoke the lan-
guage of entitlement to delineate a quasi-property interest seems
ominous in two respects. First, the very use of this terminology may
indicate that some kinds of government benefits rank higher than
others on a still unannounced priority list. Claims to receive them
may constitute "entitlement," while claims to other benefits may not
be so favored. Second, there is a lurking implication that claims to
procedural due process may require a firmer basis than claims of sub-
stantive rights. The Court had previously freed welfare recipients
of waiting period restrictions104 and demeaning income attribution
99 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
100 Id. at 262. For pre-Kelly comments on the question of statutory entitlement,
see Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive; the Obligation to Repay, 43
N.Y.U. L. REv. 451, 454-75 (1968); Note, Social Welfare-an Emerging Doctrine
of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NonTE DAME LAw. 603 (1969).
101 Reich, note 9 supra, at 1255; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733
(1964).
102 397 U.S. at 275.
103 E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
104 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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rules' 05 without invoking the language of "entitlement." It is of
course too early to wonder whether the acceptance of Professor
Reich's concept of government benefits may not jeopardize benefi-
ciaries of other sorts whose claims fall less clearly within the cat-
egory of "entitlement."
This anxiety is heightened by the Court's differentiation of wel-
fare payments from other types of benefits. At first the opinion
suggested that "relevant constitutional restraints" apply at least as
much to withdrawal of public assistance payments as to "disquali-
fication for unemployment compensation... or to denial of a tax
exemption.., or to discharge from public employment." 06 But in
deciding the issue of the right to a prior welfare hearing, the Court
drew sharp distinctions that overshadowed these analogies: "The
crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in the case of
the blacldisted government contractor, the discharged government
employee, the taxpayer denied tax exemption, or virtually anyone
else whose governmental largesse is ended-is that termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits."' 0 7 Thus emerged a paradox. On the one hand, a suggestion
that welfare payments are at least as much entitled to protection as
other benefits for which procedural safeguards have already been
prescribed. On the other hand, a clear implication that other benefi-
ciaries do not merit the new protection being accorded welfare
recipients because they have no such unique claim to a prior hear-
ing. The lack of mutuality is puzzling and confirms the hunch that
the Court has begun compiling a rank order or priority list of
government benefits. 08
In the months immediately following the Kelly decision, how-
ever, lower federal courts have given the holding a more generous
interpretation than its language might support. One federal court
of appeals found in Kelly the basis for a public housing tenant's
105 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
106 397 US. at 262. 107 Id. at 264.
108 Some doubt is cast upon the primacy of welfare benefits-briefly implied by
the Kelly and Wheeler decisions-by the Court's rejection a short time later of
welfare recipients' attacks on state maximum grant provisions. Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Cf. also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), raising
other doubts about the status of welfare benefits in the scale of priorities. See for
an early comment, May, Supreme Court Approves Maxintun Grants: Holds § 402
(a) (23) Penits Welfare Cuts, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 321 (1970).
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constitutional claim to a pre-eviction hearing,10 9 an issue the Su-
preme Court earlier avoided because of a nearly coextensive HUD
regulation. 110 A federal district judge held on the basis of Kelly
that a state prisoner may not be committed to punitive segregation
for postconviction infractions without written notice of charges
and an adversary hearing with representation by counsel."' And
in the boldest application to date, a federal district court in Ohio
held that an applicant for admission to public housing is now en-
titled to a prior hearing on the question of his eligibility before
the application is rejected: "Since the recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court [in Kelly and Wheeler] . . .it seems clear ...that
those seeking to be declared eligible for public benefits may not
be declared ineligible without the opportunity to have an eviden-
tiary hearing.""12 Thus the question that Kelly clearly did not
reach in the welfare context-the right of an applicant to be heard
before being rejected-has already been resolved in the applicant's
favor in a context the Court would presumably have deemed less
compelling than that in Kelly.
These recent decisions have begun to unfold the broader set of
issues, the relevance of Kelly to at least three types of administra-
tive action affecting the status of government beneficiaries: first,
the availability of a hearing upon dismissal, discharge, termination
or eviction; second, the procedural safeguards surrounding a re-
fusal to renew or continue a relationship at the end of a regular
term; third, the rejection of an initial application. Before parsing
these issues, however, some sort of general analytical framework
is essential. It seems appropriate to begin by identifying more ex-
plicitly than is usually done the values and limitations of the ad-
versary hearing.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: GOVERNMENT
BENEFITS AND ADVERSARY HEARINGS
Because of the way the parties narrowed the issues, the
Court in Kelly effectively subsumed the basic constitutional ques-
'
0 9 Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970). For a
consistent, pre-Kelly decision, see Ruffin v. Housing Auth., 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.
La. 1969).
110 Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
"' Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871-73 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
112 Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (N.D.
Ohio 1970).
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non. When and why does a government beneficiary merit an ad-
versary hearing on a disputed claim of eligibility? The Court
borrowed a test announced a decade earlier in determining whether
a security clearance could be revoked without a hearing. 113 Under
that formula, the governmental interests in taking summary action
must be balanced against the interests of the individual in knowing
and challenging the basis of an adverse decision. In the security
clearance case the balance weighed in the Government's favor.14
In Kelly, application of the same formula supported the claims of
the individual recipient."; Since that is about all the balancing test
offers-and since it mandates no inquiry into the basic functions
or values of an adversary hearing-deeper analysis is clearly appro-
priate.
Several guidelines must be understood at the start. First, I am
talking only about cases in which the dispute or controversy re-
volves about what Professor Kenneth Davis calls "adjudicative
facts." His definition bounds the inquiry: "Adjudicative facts are
facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties,
usually answering questions of who did what, where, when, how,
why, and with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly
the kinds of facts that go to a jury in a jury case.'"" I am not here
concerned with legislative facts or claims to be heard on deter-
minations of policy or adoption of administrative rules and regu-
lations.
Second, I confine my inquiry to relatively serious administrative
actions, actions having substantial consequences for the affected
private party. There are easy cases at both ends of the scale, of
course. When a public housing tenant is evicted, a state college
student expelled, welfare payments terminated, or a government
worker discharged, everyone would concede the action is suffi-
ciently serious to merit the concern of a court, and a fortiori of an
administrative tribunal."17 A mild reprimand or admonition, a re-
113 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
114 The decision was 5 to 4. The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Brennan, and
Douglas felt the case for an adversary hearing compelling despite the Government's
conceded security interests.
115 397 US. at 263-66. 116 Davis, note 3 supra, at 199.
117 A working formula has been offered in at least one context, that of university
discipline. Judge Doyle of the Western District of Wisconsin-who has probably
decided more student reinstatement suits than any other member of the federal
bench-has limited his concern to "serious sanctions, such as expulsion or suspension
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quest for information, a change in the timing or manner of dis-
tributing benefits-these may be sanctions too inconsequential to
warrant the heavy artillery of due process.
The hard cases lie between. A student is suspended for several
weeks; the severity of the sanction may depend critically on
whether the period is at the start or the end of a semester. A public
housing tenant is told he can no longer keep a dog in his apart-
ment; if he simply wants a friendly pet, that is one thing, but it is
quite another if he happens to be blind. The welfare recipient is
denied an increase in payments; the sanction may be very drastic
if the increase is sought to support a new member of the family,
but far less so if designed to facilitate a move to more comfortable
quarters. And so it goes through the whole range of government
benefits. A judgment about the gravity of the case simply cannot
be made in the abstract or according to any rigid rule. A careful
inquiry must be made into the precise circumstances of each case
when the sanction giving rise to a demand to be heard is of such
an intermediate sort.
Third, I shall not, for the moment, be concerned about the timing
of the hearing. Suffice it to say-and this is the essential teaching
of Kelly-that a case for a prior hearing differs only in degree and
not in kind from the case for being heard at all. The question of
the right to an adversary hearing, without regard to time, is anterior
in all cases. Once the right to be heard has been established, then
the hearing should precede the challenged action unless the agency
has strong and constitutionally valid reasons for postponement.
In any event, the matter of timing is typically an ancillary question
to be resolved separately.
A. INTERESTS AND VALUES SERVED BY AN ADVERSARY HEARING
Although cases recognizing a right to a hearing are legion, ex-
plicit statements of rationale are surprisingly rare. Perhaps the
reasons for holding or requiring hearings are so obvious they sel-
for a significant period of time." Stricldin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416, 419 (WD.
Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Professor
Charles Wrights perceptive discussion of the difficulty of delineating clearly be-
tween "severe' and "mild" penalties. Wright, note 13 supra, at 1071. Although the
range of available sanctions seems no narrower in other government benefits con-
texts, the courts do not appear even to have attempted the process of delineation
elsewhere.
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dom need reiteration. Yet there are many values served by hearings
that are not at all obvious and deserve occasionally to be brought
to light. One could not do better than begin with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's eloquent statement:""
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for
the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy;
a democratic government must therefore practice fairness;
and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided de-
termination of facts decisive of rights.
This comprehensive postulate invites a particularization of com-
ponents.
1. Accuracy and fairness. At base, only a hearing-probably only
an adversary hearing-can prevent or correct errors of fact. Mis-
takes of identity, distortions or fabrications, faulty memories, bare
deceit-these mendacious forces can be checked only when an op-
portunity is afforded to pose the truth against the falsehood. Chief
Justice Warren a decade ago explained the truth-seeking function
of an adversary hearing: "Where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends
on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case
must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue.""' The need for such confrontation is
especially important "where the evidence consists of the testimony
of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might
be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intol-
erance, prejudice or jealousy."'120
There is an additional element in the process, explaining the need
for personal participation of the affected person: "The parties,"
Professor Davis pointed out, "know more about the facts concern-
ing themselves and their activities than anyone else is likely to know,
and the parties are therefore in an especially good position to rebut
or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative facts."'' Thus
118 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
11" Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
120 bid. See also 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (showing evolution
and soundness of "the belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human state-
ments is comparable to that furnished by crossiexamination").
121 Davis, note 3 supra, at 199.
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mere adjudication is not enough; there must be an opportunity for
direct confrontation of accuser by accused if the opportunity to
seek the truth is to be meaningful.
If superficially obvious, it is nevertheless worth asking why the
administrative process should concern itself so acutely with the
quest for truth. Two interests are at stake. First, the credibility of
the process and its entitlement to respect-both by persons subject
to it and persons whose tax dollars support it-demand that a high
value be placed upon accuracy. Nothing so surely shakes public
confidence as revelations of unreliability or haphazard judgment in
important regulatory or distributive processes. 22
Second, the capacity of the administrative system to deal fairly
and justly with particular individuals who are subject to or de-
pendent upon it also requires a commitment to accuracy and truth.
Erroneous decisions are not always unjust. Indeed, occasional errors
may improperly favor one beneficiary at little or no cost to others.
But most errors are bound to produce injustice, whether by de-
privation or by misallocation.
Moreover, the consequences of erroneous judgment may be both
tragic and permanent. The student who is wrongfully expelled
without a chance to be heard may be effectively deprived of a
higher education. If he cannot take one set of exams, the sequence
may be so interrupted that he will never return. Or he may be
drafted before he has a chance to re-enroll, and may never again
be financially able to study even if he survives military service with-
out misfortune.2 3 Similar hazards mandate a hearing prior to seizure
and destruction of allegedly obscene materials. Once books have
been burned or tapes erased, restitution becomes impossible. Money
damages can be paid to the publisher or distributor, of course, if
there is a basis for civil liability against the responsible public offi-
cials. But as the Supreme Court has pointed out repeatedly in this
context, the reading or viewing public can never be made whole
after the seizure and destruction.124 The risks of irreversible error
122 See Professor Newman's comment: "The public interest in procedure itself
... is . . . to ensure that correct determinations will be made (and thus only the
deserving deprivations be effected), except where some margin of error seems
essential to avoid ills that inhere in procedure.... The problem is to set the margin
of tolerable error, given the ills of too much procedure." Newman, The Process of
Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215, 228 (1961).
123 Cf. Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969).
124 A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211-13 (1964).
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are thus too great to permit the process to operate without the
intervention of an impartial tribunal to decide the issue of obscenity.
Much the same is true in the welfare context, as the Court stressed
in Kelly. If a beneficiary is wrongfully removed from the rolls, he
can of course be restored when the truth comes out. But the effects
of even a relatively brief deprivation may be almost irremediable.
Deaths seldom result from interruption of payments. 2 ' But serious
cases of malnutrition and other grave physical harm are well known
to welfare workers.12 Thus erroneous decisions may indeed create
a degree of injustice intolerable in the disbursement of public funds.
There is another sort of injustice-serious damage to reputation-
that can be checked only through an adversary hearing. Several
courts have recognized this interest in overruling summary agency
action that implied disloyalty, incompetence, or bad moral charac-
ter.12 7 Even if no explicit charge is made against a particular appli-
cant, the very act of rejection may create such a "badge of infamy"
when it is widely understood that eligibility follows almost auto-
matically from formal qualifications.28 Only through an adversary
hearing can the applicant clear, his name of the cloud that unex-
plained exclusion casts. Thus the Supreme Court held seven years
ago that an applicant for admission to the bar was constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on adverse ex parte changes that led the Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness to exclude him summarily.
129
125 Elizabeth Wickenden reports the case of a baby who froze to death because
its parents, newly arrived in Arlington, Virginia, and completely destitute, were
denied welfare because they did not meet the now invalid one-year residence test.
See Dorsen, Poverty, Civil Liberties and Civil Rigbts: A Symposium, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 328, 339 (1966).
126 See, e.g., the description of the interim plight of the very plaintiffs in the
Kelly case. Brief for Appellees, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Appendix
A (pp. 75-91).
127E.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956); Heckler v.
Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (D. Idaho 1965); cf. Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275
(D. Conn. 1970), holding that state college authorities could not summarily reject
the application of a campus SDS group for recognition as a student organization. A
hearing must be held, inter alia, to determine whether the campus group shares the
objectives and supports the tactics of the national organization; the absence of a
hearing would leave the perhaps erroneous impression that such correspondence
does exist, thus imposing a kind of guilt by association on the local members:
128See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951).
129 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). The risks
of injustice and fundamental concepts of fairness should make clear that the basic
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2. Accountability. Adversary hearings also promote, in several im-
portant respects, the accountability of the agency. Only when
there is a record and findings based upon evidence and argument
can a reviewing court really determine, for example, whether the
agency is accurately interpreting and applying the legislative man-
date,' whether the action taken by the agency reflects valid and
substantial governmental interests,131 and whether substantive con-
stitutional interests are being adequately protected. The problem
with summary action here is not so much that it necessarily imports
error as that it is inevitably ambiguous. Only when the argument
and the reasons are spread upon the record can the reviewing court
appraise the performance of the agency and its faithfulness to its
charge.
Accountability is preserved in quite another important way
through adversary hearings. Substantive rights and liberties of gov-
ernment beneficiaries are really only as strong as the procedural
safeguards available to vindicate them. 32 If a state college student
can be expelled without a hearing or the giving of any reasons by
the administration, there is very little point in saying he has a con-
stitutional right to demonstrate peacefully on the campus. Even if
he has cheated on an examination as well as marched quietly against
the Vietnam war, there is no assurance that a proper ground of
dismissal was invoked rather than an improper ground, unless he
can know the charges against him and face his accusers in an ad-
versary setting. The recent dramatic extension of the civil liberties
of public housing tenants, government employees, and welfare cli-
need for an adversary hearing is independent of the quest for accuracy. That is,
even if complete accuracy could be achieved without a hearing (as it probably can
in some phases of many government benefit programs), critical determinations
should not be deemed "fair" in the absence of an opportunity to be heard. For only
the adversary process accords beneficiaries the dignity and respect to which they
are entitled as citizens, regardless of their dependency upon some form of govern-
ment subvention. The hearing thus serves a psychological need in the administration
of benefit programs that may be even more basic to a civilized system of adminis-
tration than the function of ascertaining the truth. Surely the development of alter-
native, even completely accurate, methods of truth-seeking would not moot the need
for hearings.
130 See generally Professor Jaffe's comments on "the role of judicial review."
JAFFE, note 51 supra, at 320-27.
131 E.g., Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 181 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
132 Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-80 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
[1970
JUSTICE DELAYED AND JUSTICE DENIED 189
ents, as well as those of students, would have been largely in vain
without the parallel expansion of procedural safeguards. Only by
insisting on the right to a hearing can the courts impose the essential
measure of agency accountability for the rights and liberties of
those to whom benefits are dispensed.
3. Visibility and impartiality. Both the appearance and the reality
of objectivity and the absence of bias require that the actions of
any tribunal be visible. Commitment to these values in the courts
is preserved by making all proceedings public save in the most
extraordinary circumstances. 33 The same public access is neither
as feasible nor as effective in keeping administrative agencies honest.
Yet the same values are operative, and to ensure them the agency
proceedings must be both accessible and visible in ways that only
adversary hearings can adequately guarantee. "The validity and
moral authority of a conclusion," Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed,
"largely depend on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is
not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slen-
der an assurance of rightness." No better way than the adversary
hearing has been found "for generating the feeling, so important
to a popular government, that justice has been done."'134
4. Consistency. The adversary hearing also serves the vital func-
tion of seeing that the agency establishes and acts in accord with
its own precedent as well as within its charter. Consistency and pre-
dictability are values of a high order in the administrative process,
even if they do not rise to the dignity of stare decisis by which
courts are bound. Summary action clearly affords no assurance of
consistency. Indeed, it invites decisions and actions varying with
the pressures and needs of the moment. If the agency must state
its reasons, and if the reasons given earlier can be cited in support
of parallel results in later parallel cases, a far higher measure of
consistency and predictability can be expected.
5. Integrity. I have already suggested some ways in which the
adversary hearing promotes the integrity of and respect for the
administrative process. But there are two additional dimensions.
If the beneficiary is entitled to confront his accusers before the
agency can penalize him, the risk of false accusation is significantly
133 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948).
134 Joint And-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
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decreased. The accuser knows that he, along with the agency that
acts on the basis of his charges, may be held accountable under
cross-examination. At the same time, the beneficiary himself may
be less likely to appeal frivolously-either when the sanction is
relatively slight or when the basis for agency action is substantially
correct-since he too realizes that the adversary hearing will dis-
cover the truth. Thus a higher measure of responsibility is imposed
upon both accuser and accused by the adversary process and the
expectation of a full, formal confrontation.
In summary, the overriding interest of both beneficiary and sys-
tem in the adversary process is the achievement of accuracy and
fairness. The requirement of notice and the opportunity for con-
frontation combine to deter erroneous agency action and to avert
the certainly harmful, sometimes irreversible, consequences of error.
Other interests also served by the adversary process are secondary
though not unimportant.
B. COUNTERVAILING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
The one set of governmental interests I have already reviewed-
emergency conditions demanding prompt action-argue not against
hearings as such but only against prior hearings. 13 5 In the govern-
ment benefits context, other types of interests may weigh more
generally against the adversary process. These interests, though
seldom dispositive, deserve careful consideration.
Perhaps most persuasive is the concern that a formal hearing may
destroy collegial, informal relationships, and set at arm's length
people who are not truly adversaries. Thus it has been much argued
recently that college student discipline is often better handled
through informal conferences with the "kindly old dean" than
through full-dress adversary hearings; that student personnel offi-
cers perform a vital counseling role that may be undermined if not
destroyed by recent court decisions; and that a once cooperative
relationship between students and administration has now become
one of conflict or combat.136 Similar arguments have been made
occasionally in other contexts-against the formalization of juvenile
135 The cases are discussed in I DAvis, note 10 supra, at § 7.08.
136E.g., PERKINS, THE UNIVERSITY AND DuE PROCESS 8 (1967); Glazer, Campus
Rights and Responsibilities: A Role for Lawyers, 39 AMERICAN SCHOL. 445, 447-51
(1970).
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court proceedings after the Kent 3 7 and Gault"3 " decisions, for ex-
ample, and even in the welfare context, where informal counseling
surely constitutes a vital aspect of the caseworker's task.139
There are several answers to these concerns. First, of course, not
every aspect of the once informal relationship has now been formal-
ized by recognition of the right to a hearing. Informal counseling
by the dean's office still reaches vastly more students on most cam-
puses than are ever involved in formal hearings.140 Moreover, the
formal hearing is mandatory only if the beneficiary himself requests
it. On the campus, in the welfare agency, or almost anywhere else
(save perhaps in the juvenile court), a preference shared on both
sides for continued informal relationships need not be thwarted by
the Due Process Clause.
Further, it is far from clear where a hostile relationship does
develop that the courts are to blame for creating it. Radical students
and punitive deans would be no more congenial in the absence of
procedural safeguards, as suggested by experience on private cam-
puses (where constitutional safeguards do not yet apply).-" Nor
would welfare mothers be any more inclined to accept passively
an arbitrary termination or reduction of payments in the absence
of a right to be heard and to appeal. Indeed, if anything, the opposite
may be the case. Protests against the system and its policies may well
be diverted into more constructive channels by creating an oppor-
tunity to confront one's accusers and vindicate one's interests in a
la Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
138 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Note especially in this regard the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing concern that the formalization of pro-
cedures may seriously undermine the values of the juvenile court because "a
juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mis-
sion and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court." Id. at 79.
111 See Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, in LAW OF THE
PooR 2, 12-13 (J. ten Broek ed. 1966).
140 Even during the troubled year 1964-65 at the University of California at
Berkeley, the chairman of the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct (a member
of the law faculty with considerable expertise in matters of procedure) concluded
that informal procedures were still appropriate, and acceptable, for 90 percent of
the cases heard-all but the highly controversial political cases. His report noted
that "the bulk of cases involves cheating or stealing or general disorderly conduct.
The student admits the charges in all but insignificant detail and attempts to explain
or justify. There is no need for pleading or charges or cross-examination."
141 See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155
(1970).
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presumably neutral forum. At least there is little evidence that the
conceded "judicialization" of many once informal relationships
between benefactor and beneficiary has exacerbated tensions cre-
ated by wholly different forces.
Second, there is a valid concern that insistence on strict pro-
cedural safeguards may rigidify the dispensation of benefits and
thus undermine important interests of a whole class of present and
potential beneficiaries. Chief Justice Burger expressed this anxiety
in his Kelly dissent. While those now on the rolls may indeed be
harder to get off the rolls, the natural bureaucratic response will
be to make it much harder for future applicants to get on these
rolls.142 Growing recognition of student rights may have caused
some universities to scrutinize their admission policies more closely,
although such surveillance has almost certainly been designed to
spot applicants who may disrupt the campus rather than those who
will demand formal adversary hearings when accused of disruption.
And the predicted result would follow only to the extent the initial
decision on eligibility remains unreviewable, a premise that is al-
ready in doubt.143
Moreover, even if better protection for those within the system
does raise the barriers for those outside, it is far from clear that such
a cost is excessive or unreasonable. Important differences between
the respective sets of interests favor greater solicitude for the in-
cumbent. There is a clear element of reliance within the system. The
public housing tenant has given up his private apartment, the student
has forgone opportunities to matriculate elsewhere, and the welfare
recipient may have given away or put beyond his control assets
that would initially have made him ineligible but would also have
kept him alive if his application had been rejected. Thus if a pref-
erence has been expressed between insider and outsider in favor
of the former and if some choice is inevitable, the choice has rightly
been made.
There is a third concern about the extension of procedural rights.
This tendency may well cause internal agency initiative to atrophy
in vital areas. If left to its own devices, the argument runs, the
administrative process would eventually do a better job than the
142 397 U.S. at 279.
143 See Note, note 58 supra, at 1327-28. And see discussion in the text infra, at
notes 202-08.
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courts, for administrators know both the needs of their beneficiaries
and the resources of the system far better than do the courts. 44
The argument finds a counterpart, again, in the Kelly case. The
dissenters argued the Court should stay its hand, since the respon-
sible agency was about to issue a ruling that would adequately meet
the needs of all parties. The proposed HEW regulation was, in
fact, more generous than the Court's mandate in certain respects.
It assured that payments would continue until the statutory fair
hearing was held and the fair hearing included certain safeguards
not demanded by the Court. Yet as we have seen, the agency
dragged its feet on promulgation of the rule for some months and
seemed to be in no mood to take the critical step unless the courts
compelled it.145 For the Court to have stayed its hand would thus
have supported the status quo rather than stimulating agency initia-
tive in fashioning new and especially appropriate procedures. In
the student dismissal area, moreover, college and university admin-
istrators moved slowly enough in the reshaping of conduct rules
and procedures even after the judicial mandate was clear. 4 Before
the courts began to speak, in the early 1960's, campus regulations
remained pretty much as they had been at the turn of the century.
Discipline at Grayson Kirk's Columbia varied little from that of
Nicholas Murray Butler's time.147 Thus the record of recent ex-
perience belies any such optimism about the self-improving impulse
of the administrative process. All too often, the only way to move
144 Compare, however, Professor Newman's view that "administrators (and in-
vestigating committees, grand juries, and in fact all lesser officials with jobs to do)
have demonstrated . . . that they are less trustworthy with respect to procedure
than are judges." Newman, note 122 supra, at 230.
145 See Christensen, note 71 supra.
146 This conclusion emerges from a study conducted in the spring of 1970 by the
author and three 1970 graduates (then third-year students) of the University of
California Law School (Boalt Hall). The study surveyed student conduct rules
at some twenty-two major universities (hdlf public and half private, paired in
eleven states). Rules and regulations were obtained for three sample years-1959-
60, 1965-66, and 1969-70. Even at the large public universities, major reforms in
procedural protections did not occur until late in the decade-suggesting that stu-
dent protest may have been a more effective catalyst for change than litigation. For
this and other conclusions from the survey, the author is particularly indebted to
Mr. Ted W. Harris of the Class of 1970 for his thorough and insightful work.
147 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students,
10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368 (1963), reporting the rather surprising results of an earlier
survey of disciplinary procedures.
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agencies toward adequate procedural safeguards for beneficiaries'
ights is for the courts to push from behind.
Fourth, it is argued that the agency's discretion may be impaired
and the confidentiality of some of its sources jeopardized by re-
quiring an adversary hearing. If, as one court has already held, a
nontenured professor is entitled to a hearing on the nonrenewal of
his term contract,148 then academic judgment may be upset and
confidentiality breached. The risks are real and grave, but not in-
evitable even in this most sensitive of areas. For if the administra-
tion (in the form of a dean or department chairman) gives consti-
tutionally valid reasons for the failure to renew the contract-i.e.,
deficient teaching, meager evidence of creative research, or inad-
equate progress toward a higher degree-that should be the end of
the matter.' 49 The right to be heard does not always encompass the
right to know who made the initial evaluations on which the ulti-
mate judgment was based. Nor need the department open all its files
to the aggrieved junior member. The scope and character of the
hearing must of course reflect common sense and vary with the
special needs and circumstances of the parties. 16 Evidence that
must be disclosed when a student is expelled for cheating-or a
faculty member suspended for plagiarism, for that matter-need
not be exposed to public view when the dispute concerns a non-
renewal. Yet the essential right to know the reasons for an adverse
determination and to argue in one's own behalf before the judgment
becomes final is not crippled by such limitations.
Finally, there is the matter of expense. Hearings are costly, both
in time and money. Lawyers are expensive, as are court reporters
and stenographers. Administrative efficiency may be impaired by
protracted hearings. Important questions may be kept in limbo in-
terminably by formalities. Lawyers comprehend all this, but laymen
do not. Thus the concern is altogether understandable, just as it is
substantial. Yet in the determination of constitutional rights, the
courts have repeatedly deemed such administrative concerns irrel-
evant. School integration cannot be postponed because it is likely
148 Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
149 See discussion of the Roth decision, text infra, at notes 199-201.
15o Cf. on the need to protect confidentiality of sources even against a fairly
strong claim of disclosure, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). Comparable
limitations could undoubtedly be fashioned for the administrative process where
appropriate to meet particular governmental exigencies.
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to cause disorder.'51 Adequate police protection cannot be denied
a controversial speaker or an unpopular parade because providing
it will be costly or inconvenient for the city.' 52 Similarly, a hearing
cannot be withheld or even postponed simply because it may be
expensive or disruptive. The agency must find ways to afford hear-
ings within its budget and get its other work done at the same time.
These are not irreconcilable goals for large bureaucratic organiza-
tions that already carry on myriad, complex, and often costly
functions.
C. CONTENT OF THE HEARING: HOW MUCH PROCESS IS DUE?
When a constitutional right to some form of hearing is recog-
nized, the most difficult part of the analysis begins. What particular
safeguards-of the dozens theoretically available to the administra-
tive process-constitute due process in the specific instance? Which
of these safeguards cannot be denied if the hearing is to be meaning-
ful? By what standards are these questions of implementation to be
decided? There is surely no simple code that furnishes the answers.
Every judge has his own sense of what "fairness" or "justice" in-
cludes in the realm of procedures, but there is no uniformity of
judicial instinct. The question of defining or prescribing due process
is-as Professors Sanford Kadish'15 and Frank Newman 54 have
perceptively shown-as perplexing as it is fundamental.
In the Kelly case, the Supreme Court majority could agree that
certain safeguards were requisite while others were dispensable.
Thus the client faced with termination had a constitutional right
to bring his own lawyer with him but not to have one appointed.
The tribunal should be impartial, but no rigid rule of separation
of functions would disqualify every member of the agency staff
who had some prior involvement with the case. An opportunity
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses was absolutely
essential, yet the Constitution did not require a verbatim transcript
of their answers. The seven-day notice that New York provided
'51 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
152 Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Calif. 1965); Williams
v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
153 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957).
154 Newman, note 122 supra.
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under existing procedure adequately apprised beneficiaries of im-
pending termination, "although there may be cases where fairness
would require that a longer time be given."'155
Thus from reading the Kelly decision we know a great deal
about what the Justices believe to be the essential elements of due
process in the particular circumstances. But we know virtually
nothing-save possibly with regard to the right of confrontation' 6
-about the reasons why particular guarantees obtain at a given
stage of the administrative process.
The lower courts have had to fend for themselves in shaping the
contours of process that is due government beneficiaries. Within
the past five years, for example, each of the following issues has
been litigated in the context of state college student expulsion or
dismissal: (1) How far in advance of the hearing must notice be
given, and in what form? 157 (2) Does the student have a right to
be represented at the hearing by counsel-and does it make a differ-
ence whether the university appears by an attorney?""8 (3) Must
the hearing be public if the student requests it? If the university
wishes a public hearing but the student desires it closed? 19 (4)
Does the student or his attorney have a right to examine adverse
statements on which the charges are based?160 To cross-examine
adverse witnesses at the hearing?1 1 (5) Must a verbatim transcript
in detailed summary of the testimony be kept?16 2 (6) May the
committee or hearing officer proceed in absentia if the student fails
15' 397 U.S. at 268.
156 Id. at 269-70.
157 Compare Due v. Florida Agricultural & Mechanical Univ., 283 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Fla. 1963), with Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo.
1968).
158Compgre Barker v. Hardway, 233 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), with
French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
159 Compare Butmny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968), with Moore v.
Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (MD. Ala. 1968).
160 See Estaban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo.
1967).
161 Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.
1961), with Estaban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D.
Mo. 1967).
162 Compare Due v. Florida Agricultural & Mechanical Univ., 283 F. Supp. 396,
403 (ND. Fla. 1963), with Estaban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,
652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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to appear after receiving timely notice?163 (7) Must the person
who has the power to impose sanctions or penalties actually hear
the case or study the transcript?1 64 (8) Must there be a complete
separation of functions and a prohibition of ex parte communication
between those who prosecute and those who decide? 6 5 (9) Must
the student have an opportunity to appeal internally from an ad-
verse decision at the initial level? 1' (10) May a student be sus-
pended on an interim basis or must the hearing precede even a
temporary change in status, and in what circumstances?0 7
The wonder is not that so many specific safeguards have been
sought but rather that in nearly all the ten enumerated areas the
lower federal and state courts have divided sharply. Some have held
there is a right to counsel in all cases, others that there is no such
right of representation, and at least one other that the student may
bring his lawyer whenever the university appears by counsel.
Comparable divisions characterize most of the other areas, making
it virtually impossible to give clear answers to university adminis-
trators who seek guidance in developing disciplinary codes con-
sistent with due process. There is certainty only at the extremes.
On the one hand, the student must be given formal notice of the
specific charges. On the other hand, guilt need not be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt or determined by a jury.
The task of prescribing due process thus remains at large. What
guideposts might mark the path more clearly?0 8 First, we could
103 Compare Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968), with
Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
104 See Estaban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo.
1967).
165 Conpare Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1968), with Jones
v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
160 Compare Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961),
with Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La. 1968).
1067 Compare Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968),
with Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
10 8 British and Commonwealth courts have recently found it necessary to under-
take a strikingly similar inquiry in student dismissal cases. The touchstone there
has been "natural justice" rather than "due process"-a phrase of comparable breadth
and imprecision. In University of Ceylon v. Fernando, 61 Ceylon New L. Rep.
505 (1960), it was held that in the absence of stated rules to be followed in dis-
missing a student for alleged cheating on an examination, principles of natural jus-
tice did entide the student to "be adequately informed of the case he had to
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begin with a model of some sort-the criminal trial or the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act-and then require the
agency to justify any deviations from that model. Some years ago
Professor Kadish suggested a formula for what he called "justifi-
cation of the attenuated procedure": 109
Whether it be determined that the impact is equivalent to or
less than the consequences of a criminal conviction, a rational
decision of whether the demands of due process allow any
attenuation of traditional procedures must depend upon the
case made in justification for the attenuation. The relation
between the two factors would appear to be direct; the greater
the severity of the impact of the determinations, the greater
the degree of urgency and persuasiveness that must be shown.
In the area of the federal employee loyalty program, for
example, the Court has indicated its conviction that the impact
of findings of disloyalty is similar to criminal sanctions. One
might expect, therefore, the requirement of a relatively strong
justification for increasing the hazard of misdeterminations.
This particular choice of model or norm may not be right for
government benefit cases. Professor Newman has suggested the
need for "awareness that due process sometimes should give people
more rights than criminal proceedings ensure. The fact that pretrial
discovery may be narrow in criminal cases, for example, hardly
means that it should be no broader in hearings on license applica-
tions."' 70 For the same reason the Administrative Procedure Act,
which already incorporates compromises between competing inter-
meet, and given an adequate opportunity of meeting it." The denial of cross-
examination was held not to be a violation of natural justice in the absence of a
timely request for confrontation.
For a much later and more elaborate inquiry into the relevant principles of
natural justice, see R. v. Senate of the University of Aston, [2] 1969 All E.R. 964
(Q.BD. 1969). The Justices concluded that naturdl justice had been denied when
the university proceeded to expel without a formal hearing of any sort-especially
since the examiners had considered issues other than the student's academic per-
formance in reaching their decision. Id. at 975.
See also, for a less generous view of the scope of natural justice in student dismis-
sal cases, King v. University of Saskatchewan, 68 W.W.R. 745 (Sup. Ct. of Canada
1969). The court held that faculty members could serve in the same case on both
inferior and superior tribunals within the university.
169 Kadish, note 153 supra, at 352.
170 Newman, note 122 supra, at 220. The criminal model may'also be inappropriate
because of its emphasis on the role of the jury and the value of judgment by peers.
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ests, should not be the norm. The question here is not whether fur-
ther attenuation is justified, but whether any departures are war-
ranted. This caution suggests a second approach. Rather than taking
an existing model of procedure as the point of departure, one should
start with a hypothetical proceeding in which all guarantees are
fully enjoyed, and then require justification of any deviations from
that ideal base. The hypothetical model would thus amalgamate the
best of the criminal and civil procedure on the assumption that both
could be practiced in a single forum. Exceptions or variations could
then be authorized on a selective basis, reflecting particular govern-
mental interests.
Certain obvious deviations from the ideal model would require no
justification. No one seriously argues, for example, that a "grand
jury" must "indict" the beneficiary before a hearing can occur, al-
though the requirement of a prior hearing may serve some of the
very same interests. It is not claimed that "guilt" must be proved ac-
cording to the criminal standard, although it is vital to recognize
that the agency or government bears the initial burden of proof on
all disputed facts. In addition to these safeguards which are simply
inappropriate to the administrative process, others might be posi-
tively harmful, or destructive of the flexibility and informality that
should mark agency proceedings at their best. Thus the criminal or
even civil trial rules of evidence are never invoked in agency hear-
ings, and should not be. A complete separation of functions (of the
sort essential to preserve judicial integrity) might undermine the
agency's vital counseling function, preventing a senior professor,
for example, from advising and informally reviewing the work of a
junior nontenured colleague if he is later to sit in judgment on the
younger man's case. Such departures as these require no justification
beyond reference to the nature of administrative procedure.
A wholly different approach to the due process determination
would be to start at the opposite end-assuming only the bare essen-
tials of a hearing-and require the beneficiary or claimant to justify
augmentation. The presumption, in other words, would be against
representation by counsel, but the beneficiary could make a show-
ing of special need for legal advice on the basis of the complexity of
the case or his own inability to present or challenge the critical evi-.
dence, etc. But procedural safeguards should not be so jealously re-
served or sparingly dispensed. Given the relative familiarity with
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the administrative process, it is certainly harder for the beneficiary
in a single instance to show why he should have a particular pro-
tection then for the agency to demonstrate why he should not have
it. Thus if there are any presumptions, they should run in the bene-
ficiary's favor with the burden of rebuttal on the agency.
There is a third and middle ground that may best serve the inter-
ests of agency and beneficiary alike. A reviewing court should insist
initially upon a rather high level of protection in all cases-includ-
ing representation by counsel and probably appointed counsel for
all indigents; 171 opportunity for discovery and for cross-examina-
tion; preparation of a transcript or at least the making of a com-
plete tape of the hearing; a public hearing; and so on. If the bene-
ficiary feels stricter safeguards are essential, he can seek them and
after an adverse decision can appeal the denial of them. The court
will then examine the particular balance of interests and equities and
decide-as courts have frequently done in the student dismissal cases
-whether a higher standard should apply on an ad hoc basis. Con-
versely, if the agency feels special needs warrant dilution of the
regular protections-a vital source of information would be jeop-
ardized by disclosure, or a public hearing would be unmanageable-
it can make the exception and proceed subject to judicial review
under the same standards. Experience with enough cases of this sort
should generate a set of procedural standards sufficient to protect
the interests of all parties.
D. FULL JUDICIAL REVIEW: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE
ADVERSARY HEARING?
When an agency fails to hold a full hearing and the matter comes
before a reviewing court, it is sometimes suggested that the admin-
istrative default can be cured by de novo judicial review. 72 It is true
the court can certainly perform most or all of the adjudicative tasks
as well as the agency-indeed, in some respects better, because the
court has compulsory process, more. effective constraints against
171 Not only does the new regulation of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare provide for counsel in fair hearings, see note 88 supra, but the Federal
Trade Commission has ordered that counsel be made available to indigents appear-
ing before the commission to answer charges. This is apparently the first federal
regulatory agency to confer such a right in civil proceedings. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
1970, p. 67, col. 4.
112 For the strongest such suggestion, see Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co.,
169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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contempt, better procedures for making records, and so on. But
for the typical government beneficiary, judicial review must be a
supplement and not a substitute for the administrative hearing to
which he is entitled.
The court cannot cure the agency's dereliction for a variety of
reasons. First, the costs of litigation are incalculably greater. Even
with the aid of volunteer lawyers, few welfare recipients can afford
to file lawsuits every time they are threatened with termination.
Other beneficiaries, notably middle-class college students and pub-
lic employees, must bear the entire costs, since they seldom qualify
for legal aid. Second, there are often rather serious barriers to judi-
cial review of withdrawal of government benefits, and a fortiori to
initial denial of claims. Whatever vestiges remain of the "privilege"
concept of public largesse emerge as rules of standing and justicia-
bility when agency discretion in withholding or taking away a
benefit is challenged in court.173 Third, there is of course nothing
to challenge in court if the agency acts summarily and without ex-
planation. Judicial review is possible only if there is some record
either in the form of a hearing or at least a statement of reasons for
the action. Fourth, the long delays created by typically overcrowd-
ed dockets make judicial review a meaningful alternative only for
the beneficiary who can afford to wait. Thus the welfare recipient
or public housing tenant is usually in no position to wait until his
case comes to the top of the calendar in the ordinary course. There
is of course, no guarantee that the administrative process acts more
promptly. But if the agency must stay its hand until the question of
eligibility has been determined within, there is at least a strong in-
centive for dispatch of a kind that finds no counterpart in the courts.
Thus for many reasons court review provides no appropriate alter-
native to agency hearing.
Are there other alternatives? The agency does have a choice
where a prior hearing is required. "Due process does not, of course,
require two hearings," the Court recognized in Kelly. "If, for ex-
ample, a state simply wishes to continue benefits until after a 'fair'
hearing there will be no need for a preliminary hearing." 174 The
matter of timing does afford the agency some option. But there is
173 Recent relaxations of the rules of standing have, of course, made judicial
review more accessible for all plaintiffs, including those seeking to vindicate a
claim to government largesse. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
174 397 U.S. at 267 n. 14.
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no suggestion here or elsewhere that the basic functions and values
of an adversary hearing can be served by any other procedure yet
devised. In the absence of some hypothetical alternative model, it
seems axiomatic that only a hearing can afford an aggrieved bene-
ficiary a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
III. THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED
One task remains: To apply the abstract analysis to particu-
lar situations. Three phases in the dispensation of government bene-
fits merit attention-the termination or dismissal, the nonrenewal,
and the rejection of an initial application. One preliminary matter
must, however, be disposed of: the cases involving licenses or ad-
mission to professional or occupational practice.
A. THE LICENSING CASES: SUI GENERIS
Read broadly, the cases involving the denial or granting of pro-
fessional and other licenses would resolve all other problems. The
Supreme Court long ago held that an accountant could not be de-
nied admission to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals without
a hearing.1 5 More recently the Court took a similar view of New
York's rejection of an application for admission to the bar based
upon unfavorable character references.' It is assumed a fortiori
that the withdrawal or cancellation of a license or permit to practice
an occupation or profession requires some formal hearing. 177 If the
licensing cases were applicable in other contexts, there would be no
need for further inquiry.
The licensing cases are not, however, adequate precedent for the
government benefits area. Fundamentally, a license is much more a
form of regulation than a dispensation of government largesse.
Were there no regulation at all, however essential that regulation
might be, any person who wished could undertake the licensed ac-
tivity at his own risk. The granting of the license thus involves a
determination of competence and qualification within the scope of
regulatory power, a selection of some among all those who seek
175 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1926).
176 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-06 (1963).
Cf. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
177 See generally 1 DAVIs, note 10 supra, at § 7.18.
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access to the regulated field or activity. In this sense the denial of a
license represents a limitation or restraint upon the theoretical lib-
erty of the citizen in an unregulated society.
Moreover, the rejection of an application automatically implies
some lack of competence, moral character, or responsibility. This
inference arises because in most regulated sectors-save possibly for
broadcasting by radio and television-there is no quantitative reason
for denying any new applicant a chance to enter the field. Whether
he can practice profitably is his own business. Whether there are too
many lawyers or doctors or automobile drivers or liquor dealers is
no business of the licensing agency, whose sole concern should be
one of quality: to protect the public, and sometimes other members
of the regulated sector, from incompetent or inferior practitioners.
The denial of most applications for government benefits imports
no such stigma. The number of opportunities available at any given
time is limited, even perhaps in the welfare area. Public housing
projects typically have many more applicants than vacancies. 7 '
State colleges and universities can admit only a fraction of prospec-
tive matriculants. Government agencies can hire only a limited
number of employees and, except in the Post Office and menial lines
of work, applications exceed openings. Thus a rejection or denial
may reflect a judgment about competence or character. But that is
not, as with the denial of a license, the inevitable implication of
adverse action.
For both reasons, then, the case of the licensee or prospective
licensee is rather different from that of the typical government
beneficiary. Though the Supreme Court has never sought to dis-
tinguish the two classes of cases-indeed, in Kelly it rather casually
assimilated them-the distinction seems clear enough to demand a
separate analysis. The insistence upon granting a hearing to the li-
censee or applicant may thus be persuasive by analogy but hardly
dispositive of the issues now before us.
B. DISCHARGE, DISMISSAL, TERMINATION, EXPULSION, AND EVICTION
I begin with the easiest of the three phases in the dispensation of
government benefits. In many programs, the matter is already set-
178 See the figures on the ratio of applicants to vacancies in New York City-
about 10:1 in recent years. PROJECT ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, HOUSING FOR THE
POOR: RIGMrs AND REMEDIES 172, n. 41 (1967).
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tled. For welfare recipients, Kelly clearly established both the right
to a full hearing and the right to an adversary prior hearing. For
public housing tenants, comparable rights have been recognized by
administrative regulation, reinforced by one Supreme Court deci-
sion,' 79 and more recently given constitutional underpinning by sev-
eral lower federal courts. 80
The state college or university student, too, clearly has a consti-
tutional right to a hearing when he is expelled or suspended for a
substantial period. 8" The only issue that remains is one of timing.
Prior to Kelly the lower federal courts divided on the question
whether a college could suspend the student first and then hold the
hearing later, the controversial practice of interim suspension.8 2 In
Kelly the Supreme Court said nothing about students in distinguish-
ing other types of beneficiaries. Yet equities similar to those of the
welfare client could surely be invoked in the case of a student sum-
marily suspended on the eve of examinations or at a time when he
is draft-vulnerable or in a way that will forfeit a fellowship. When-
ever such special circumstances are present, the case for a prior
hearing seems compelling. Even when no special equities are present,
the university should bear the burden of showing why it cannot
hold even a preliminary hearing before imposing a suspension. 3
This leaves public employment as the area in which, ironically,
the question of the right to a hearing was earliest litigated but last
to be resolved. A casual comment in Kelly might suggest otherwise:
"Relevant constitutional restraints," observed Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, "apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance as to...
discharge from public employment."'81 4 The citation supporting the
179 Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
180 Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970);
Ruffin v. Housing Auth., 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969).
181 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
182 Compare Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn.
1968), 'with Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (W.D. Wis. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970).
183 Indeed, in one of the very earliest student dismissal cases of the 1960's, it was
simply assumed that a prior hearing would be granted if the right to a hearing was
recognized at all. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn.
1961) (due process required "an opportunity to present [the students'] side of the
case before such drastic disciplinary action was invoked by the university author-
ities").
184 397 U.S. at 262.
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reference was to Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,85 a 1956
decision involving a tenured professor at Brooklyn College who had
been summarily dismissed for invoking the privilege of the Fifth
Amendment before a congressional investigating committee. A regu-
lation of the board made discharge mandatory and automatic under
such circumstances. The Court held that a claim of constitutional
right could not be made the sole basis for summary discharge of a
public employee. At the close of the opinion, Mr. Justice Clark did
say something about a hearing: "86
The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of
its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show
Slochower's continued employment to be inconsistent with a
real interest of the State. But there has been no such inquiry
here. We hold that the summary dismissal of appellant violates
due process of law.
This statement, while surely relevant, is very far from establishing
a government employee's right to a hearing on dismissal. That is
clear both from the context and from later decisions. The Court in
Slochower really said no more than that the ground on which the
dismissal was based-resort to a constitutional privilege not to in-
criminate one's self-clearly would not support so serious a sanction.
The only way in which the state could use Slochower's conduct as
the basis for dismissal was by establishing a relationship between that
conduct and some valid interest of the state or the university-for
example, by showing that he had perjured himself or been contemp-
tuous of the committee. Such a nexus could be determined only by
a hearing. Thus a hearing would have to be held, not before
Slochower could be dismissed at all, but before he could be dis-
missed for a constitutionally protected act.
Later cases support this limited view of Slochower. The Court has
gone back and forth on the matter of a public employee's right to a
hearing, coming very close to recognizing such a right but avoiding
the constitutional question in Greene v. McElroy,'8 7 then backing
away again in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. Mc-
Elroy.188 (The latter case established the balancing test used by the
Court in Kelly, but ultimately denied the request for a hearing on
cancellation of a security clearance.) One important milepost along
185 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 187 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
180 d. at 559. 188 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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the way is the 1959 decision in Vitarelli v. Seaton. s9 There the
Court held that a public employee is entitled to a hearing if agency
procedures confer such a right. The agency cannot play fast and
loose with its own rules, adhering to them when it wishes but by-
passing them when it does not. The basic constitutional question
was not in focus. But the Court simply assumed that Vitarelli (a
professional employee of the Department of the Interior) "could
have been summarily discharged... at any time without the giving
of a reason."'90 Later, the Court observed that neither an act of Con-
gress nor an executive order (dealing with internal security matters)
"alter[ed] the power of the Secretary to discharge summarily an
employee in petitioner's status, without the giving of any reason."'u9
The problem of the case was that the Secretary "gratuitously de-
cided to give a reason" and because the reason given was national
security, backed himself into a procedural web foreclosing summary
action.
Sloebo'wer and Vitarelli, taken together, suggest only that when
the sole reason given for a dismissal is either a constitutionally in-
valid one or one that requires, by statute or regulation, compliance
with specific procedures, there is a right to a hearing. In both cases,
moreover, the stated basis of the adverse judgment bore so heavily
on the integrity or the loyalty of the employee as to create a "badge
of infamy," an implication so damaging that only a full hearing
could vindicate the individual's interest in reputation and make it
possible for him to obtain employment in the private sector.
Absent these special equities, the public employee's claim to a
hearing rests on shaky precedent. Many Supreme Court decisions
have reinforced substantive rights of government workers: not to be
discharged for criticizing the policies of the agency or superior offi-
cials;192 not to be required to sign a loyalty oath that infringes free-
dom of expression;193 not to be compelled to disclose constitutional-
ly protected affiliations,194 etc. But nothing has been said about the
right to a hearing since the Cafeteria Workers case, in which a hear-
ing had been denied for security reasons and the action was sustained
by a sharply divided Court. Incredible as it may seem, only one
189 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
190 Id. at 539. 191 Ibid.
192 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
193 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
194 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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lower federal court decision' 95 appears to recognize unequivocally
a constitutional right to be heard before employment is terminated,
and even that judgment masquerades as generous construction of
agency regulations.
Long before Kelly, the courts had accorded government workers
a host of substantive rights that could be vindicated only through
adversary hearings, the requirement of specific charges, and an op-
portunity to confront and cross-examine accusers. 9 6 Moreover, the
disparity in treatment between government employees and other
beneficiaries seems inexplicable. Being fired from a government job
is at least as serious a sanction as being evicted from a housing proj-
ect or being suspended from college. Nor are there unique interests
attending the government's function as employer that find no paral-
lels in the responsibilities of landlord, educator, and benefactor.
There may, of course, be special problems in particular cases. Claims
to confidentiality of sources may well be stronger in security dis-
charge proceedings than in eviction or expulsion cases. But these
interests can surely be respected without denying generally the
right to an adversary hearing. And unless special circumstances in-
tervene, the hearing should occur prior to the effective date of the
discharge for all the reasons already discussed.
C. NONRENEWALS OF GOVERNMENT BENEFITS
The distinction between a termination and a nonrenewal is not
always easy to define. Many benefits are technically granted for
only a limited term. But the presumption of continuing eligibility
is so strong that a refusal to renew or extend the relationship is prop-
erly treated as a termination. A student enrolls for only a year at a
time. But if a freshman is denied, for nonacademic reasons, a chance
to enroll for the sophomore year, he is really being terminated rather
than denied a renewal of his student status. 97 A public housing ten-
ant, similarly, may have a lease for a year-or even on a month-to-
month basis-but a refusal to renew or extend the lease is tanta-
mount to an eviction and so treated by the courts.'98
105 Olson v. Regents, 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
106 See generally Linde, note 94 supra; Van Alstyne, note 10 supra.
17 Saunders v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 417 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1969).
108 In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), for example, the
Court treated as an "eviction" the exercise of the housing authority's option under
the lease to terminate tenancy by giving notice at least fifteen days before the end
161]
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The paradigm case of true nonrenewal is, of course, the non-
tenure academic appointment. There is a mild presumption that the
instructor or assistant professor who does satisfactory teaching and
makes adequate progress toward a higher degree will be continued,
at least until the tenure decision is made. But there is nothing auto-
matic about this relationship as about the others just cited. Histori-
cally, therefore, it has simply been assumed that a nontenure em-
ployee could be dropped at the end of a term without the giving of
any reasons and with no recourse. Within recent months, however,
a pair of federal district court decisions have dramatically altered
this easy assumption on which academic and other public adminis-
trators have operated.
In Roth v. Board of Regents,'99 Judge Doyle of the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin held that a nontenure assistant professor may not
be denied renewal without a statement of the reasons for the action
and an opportunity at least to be heard in his own behalf. Starting
with the assumption that improper reasons did not in fact underlie
the action before him, Judge Doyle nonetheless concluded that the
enforcement of substantive safeguards to which a public employee
is now entitled would require a hearing in nonrenewal cases as much
as in dismissals or discharges of tenured faculty and workers covered
by civil service. For the failure to renew without giving any reasons
could as well mask constitutionally improper reasons as reflect a
constitutionally valid judgment about professional achievement and
progress.
The decision is far less drastic than might at first appear. It does
not hold that a full adversary hearing must be held on every non-
renewal, or that confidential documents must be disclosed:20 0
The burden of going forward and the burden of proof rests
with the professor. Only if he makes a reasonable showing that
the stated reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for deci-
sion or that they are wholly without basis in fact would the
of any monthly term. Such action was an eviction rather than a nonrenewal because
the lease also entitled the tenant to automatic renewal for successive monthly
terms unless the family composition or income were altered or specific terms of the
lease violated.
109 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970). See also the companion case, Gouge v.
Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970), extending similar
procedural protections to public school teachers.
200 310 F. Supp. at 980.
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university administration become obliged to show that the
stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis
in fact.
The opinion does not say how precise the stated reasons must be
to shift the burden of proof. If explanations like "unsatisfactory
teaching" or "limited evidence of distinguished scholarship" would
suffice, the duty placed upon the administration by the Roth deci-
sion would be rather slight. The possibility remains, moreover, that
a decision resting in fact on one ground (i.e., controversial political
activities) may be justified for the record on another (i.e., lack of
scholarly output), since the performance of few junior faculty
members is academically or pedagogically impeccable. Nor does the
decision insulate against largely ad hominem judgments reflecting
the personal likes and dislikes of elder colleagues. Nonetheless,
Judge Doyle has clearly taken a bold step toward lifting the shroud
of secrecy that has long surrounded the nonrenewal of probationary
appointments. The case seriously undermines the belief that a non-
tenure employee can be summarily terminated by giving no reasons
and may obtain judicial review only if the agency gratuitiously
gives an invalid or implausible reason.
Meanwhile, parallel efforts are being made to ensure these same
safeguards. Committee A of the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors recently proposed a new set of procedures to guide
renewal decisions. The statement recommends, inter alia, that a jun-
ior teacher should be entitled to notice in writing of the reasons for
a decision not to renew his appointment, and should be able to seek
review by a "decision-making body." That body should have au-
thority to request reconsideration by the appropriate faculty com-
mittee when it concludes that insufficient deliberation was initially
given the matter.20'
The solution to the nonrenewal problem lies in recognizing its
intermediate character in the range of administrative actions and in
devising commensurate procedures. The decision not to extend a
contract or appointment for a further term is less drastic than a dis-
charge or dismissal from a continuing or tenured position, but more
drastic than the typical decision not to grant the appointment ini-
201 The new guidelines were first announced in Chronicle of Higher Educ.,
April 13, 1970, p. 4, cols. 3-5. See also Report of Connmittee A, 1969-70, 56
AA.U.P. BuLL. 153, 167 (1970).
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tially. The Roth decision and the Committee A proposals attempt to
reflect precisely that fact by fashioning a hearing procedure that
assures adequate notice of the action and its basic rationale and
which affords a chance to argue against the decision and its under-
pinning. Although no cross-examination or disclosure of confiden-
tial files is contemplated, at least at the outset, administrators ac-
customed to announcing nonrenewals without any explanation may
find the new requirements burdensome and annoying. Yet presum-
ably they can learn to live with these new rules, designed as they
are to ensure fundamental fairness at the threshold of a young
man's career.
D. REJECTION OR DENIAL OF INITIAL APPLICATIONS
We come at length to what may be the hardest case of all, the
one on which existing law is least helpful. There are easy situations
at the two extremes. On the one end, the licensing cases in which the
Supreme Court has twice unequivocally held there is a constitution-
al right to a hearing when the applicant meets all the formally stated
criteria for admission. 02 At the other extreme, no one supposes
there is a right to be heard when one candidate for a prize scholar-
ship is chosen over many others, or when the President fails to nomi-
nate to a diplomatic post a person whose friends have eagerly rec-
ommended him. The hard cases lie across the broad middle range.
The matter is not quite so simple as the district judge thought in the
Toledo public housing case holding, after Kelly, that "those seeking
to be declared eligible for public benefits may not be declared ineli-
gible without the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing."
203
Nor is the issue as clear the other way as it seemed to the welfare
clients' attorneys in Kelly, who urged the Court to respect the
"well-founded and established distinction between initial denial and
revocation of statutory rights, entitlements or privileges. 20 4 In fact,
a hearing may be appropriate to some kinds of rejections and denials
but inappropriate to others. What is needed is a set of standards to
202 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-06 (1963);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1926).
203 Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795, 797 (N.D.
Ohio 1970).
204 Brief in Reply to the United States as Amicus Curiae, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), at 6. Cf. Note, note 58 supra, at 1327-28.
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guide the particular judgment. The following questions suggest a
framework.
1. Effect of rejection upon the applicant. At least two sorts of
consequences flowing from a denial or rejection may warrant some
sort of hearing, the one to reputation, the other to subsistence. The
license cases point up the importance of holding a hearing when the
rejection creates an automatic inference damaging to the applicant's
reputation (for competence, for moral character, for loyalty) .205
The inference arises either where such licenses are granted pro
forma, or where the particular applicant clearly meets every cri-
terion except the one that centrally involves his reputation or stand-
ing. An equally compelling case can be made for challenging the
inference generated by denial of a security clearance or even per-
haps the rejection of an employment application for a highly sensi-
tive job.
Subsistence or survival is an individual interest meriting at least
comparable solicitude. Generally, it is true the incumbent welfare
beneficiary or tenant has a greater claim to be heard than the sup-
pliant. But this is not always the case. The evicted tenant may well
be able to live with relatives while his case is being resolved, while
the applicant may have come to the gates only because all other
sources of shelter have been exhausted. The seeker of welfare may
sometimes be even more destitute than the receiver and thus in great-
er need of a prompt and equitable resolution of his claim. Even large
and bureaucratic agencies should be able to examine briefly at the
threshold the circumstances of the initial applicant, and in deserv-
ing cases to grant a prompt hearing or extend a form of emergency
aid pending resolution.
2. Nature of the decision-making process. The availability of a
hearing at the application stage should also vary with the nature of
the particular decision. Many judgments about eligibility are too
simple and obvious to warrant a hearing, as where a claimant aged
sixty-two is rejected for social security or retirement benefits that
do not commence until age sixty-five. Others may reflect simply the
application to uncontested facts of general policies or rules. These
do not come within the "adjudicative" area at all. At the other ex-
treme, some eligibility decisions may be so complex or may neces-
sarily involve such vast discretion-high-level administrative ap-
20 E.g., Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841, 847-52 (D. Idaho 1965).
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pointments, awarding of prizes, fellowships, and the like-that no
readily ascertainable standards could be brought to bear in review-
ing the rejection. Between the easy cases lie many in which the
process is moderately complex or involves a measure of discretion
exercised within broad guidelines or regulations. For these cases a
hearing would not be inappropriate or unmanageable. The ultimate
decision whether to grant it must depend upon the degree of com-
plexity of discretion, tempered by the several other factors consid-
ered here.2 °6
3. Relationship of hearing to substantive interests. Sometimes a
hearing will be deemed essential even though neither of the fore-
going elements is present, simply to vindicate vital substantive in-
terests of the class from which the particular applicant comes. If
one black person is rejected for a government job, that fact does not
create a justiciable claim by itself. But if several blacks are rejected
and there is reason to believe less qualified whites are being hired, a
hearing may be essential simply to establish whether or not the agen-
cy is practicing subtle racial discrimination and to prevent future
bias.
For just this reason one court has implied that an applicant for
public employment may not be rejected for refusing to sign a loy-
alty oath without a chance to explain his reasons for refusing. The
court concluded that the basic principle of pertinent Supreme Court
loyalty-security decisions simply could not be vindicated without
an opportunity for the arguably loyal nonsigner to be heard. 07
4. Relationship of hearing to the administrative process and agen-
cy performance. For similar reasons a court may occasionally re-
quire an agency to articulate its standards for acceptance and rejec-
tion of applicants.08 The agency may take the hint and issue
regulations on its own. But if it fails to do so, leaving prospective
applicants in the dark about the criteria actually employed or the
way in which conduct may be shaped to gain or retain eligibility,
206 two recent illustrations of situations in which a hearing has been required
on denial of an initial application, see Healy v. James, 311 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (D.
Conn. 1970), involving eligibility of a controversial political group for recognition
as a campus student organization, and Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp., 963 (N.D.
Miss. 1969), involving applications of controversial speakers for access to college
and university campus forums.
207 Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841, 847-52 (D. Idaho 1965).
208 E.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968),
in which the court of appeals strongly urged the Housing Authority to publish and
define the criteria used in determining eligibility for admission to projects.
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hearings on particular cases-chosen almost at random-may be the
only way to force the agency to explain publicly how it manages
the intake process. It may also be the only way in which other
branches of government-notably the courts called upon to review
agency decisions and the legislature asked to appropriate funds for
its support-will be able to judge an important dimension of admin-
istrative performance. The equities of the individual applicant or
even of the class from which he comes are relatively unimportant
under this rubric. The essential factor is the willingness and capacity
of the agency to keep the public apprised of its standards.
This discussion at least suggests the error of confining procedural
safeguards at the initial stage to the licensing cases. There are few
government benefit programs, perhaps none, in which an agency
should not occasionally be required to explain and justify a rejec-
tion, either because the equities of a particular case are compelling
or because agency responsibility can be assured only in this way.
The Kelly decision neither affirms nor denies such a principle. Yet
much of what the Court said about the plight of the beneficiary who
is forced off the welfare rolls logically applies to the welfare claim-
ant who is kept off the rolls for equally invalid or erroneous reasons.
The case in which the Court will have to consider the extension of
its logic may not be far in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Is the right to a hearing worth the quest, after all? How sub-
stantial a guarantor of individual rights is procedural due process?
Professor Joel Handler has wisely warned that assimilation of gov-
ernment benefit dispeming procedures to those employed in regu-
latory and licensing contexts may be an unreal goal, not because it
cannot be attained, but because it will not necessarily produce major
reform. The range of discretion in administration of most govern-
ment benefit programs is so vast, so far beyond the reach of review-
ing courts, that judicialization of procedure may reach only the
highest level and most visible agency actions. Thus Professor Hand-
ler cautions: 209
The experience of administration of business regulation afid
the peculiar problems of welfare administration cast doubt on
the benefits to be gained from a program of rights. Its lack
209 Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, in LAw
OF THE PooR 155, 176 (J. ten ,Broek ed. 1966).
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of utility in helping to fulfill the broader legislative goals-the
rehabilitation of people-changing aspects of welfare programs
-is manifest.
Yet it may be premature to judge the efficacy of quasi-judicial
procedures in the government benefits context until we have more
of them. The safeguards actually available to the beneficiary are still
so far behind not only the criminal process but the business-regula-
tory context as well that major progress would be required even to
establish a basis of comparison. Perhaps welfare beneficiaries and
public housing tenants will not be greatly helped by knowing why
they are being terminated or evicted. The agency will often take its
course anyway, undeterred by the annoying demand of formalities.
But the history and the essential premises of due process are more
hopeful. Strict adherence to fair procedures is at least worth a try.2 10
210 There is a final and perplexing question beyond the scope of this discussion
but unavoidable in any complete analysis: How far can case-by-case constitutional
adjudication really ensure the basic values claimed for due process? In a recent
letter to the author, Professor Hans Linde cautions on this point: "I do not believe
that the solution to the problems of fair administration of mass benefits can be found
in the due process clause but only in legislative reforms that minimize the need for
factual determinations and discretionary judgments. This does not do away with
the need for deciding due process cases in the form in which they now arise. But
• . . due process analysis cannot itself cope with the problems; it can only demon-
strate, and hasten, the need for legislative restructuring of the programs."
[1970
